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Globalization, in its multiple interpretations, is seen by many people as a great possibility of improving
living standards in developing countries. Trade and ﬁnancial integration can encourage competition, tech-
nology transfers and specialization according to comparative advantage principles. Indeed, after decades of
protectionism with very poor results, many countries have actively opened their economies to global com-
petition in search for such great opportunities. Although in many cases the results are encouraging, for a
vast group of countries the last two or three decades have been years of turmoil, stagnation and ﬁnancial
crises. These complications have enhanced the criticisms across the world to the process of global integration
(Stiglitz (2002)).
This paper argues that many of these costs follow from governments’ policies aimed to limit or restrict
the scope of integration of countries with the rest of the world. In the presence of international technology
diﬀerences, limited or restricted integration may generate wage and employment adjustments that could be
avoided if countries were to embrace globalization without restrictions. I present a very stylized model where
ﬁnancial integration leads to specialization. In this setting, countries that avoid specialization through trade
distortions have much greater downward pressures on wages than countries that do specialize. Moreover, if
non-tradable prices are downward rigid and there are some limits to the current account deﬁcits countries
can run, employment costs may arise. The model shows that these costs may be greater with a limited-
globalization strategy than with a laissez-faire policy.
1Key Words: Globalization, Wages, Employment, Technology Diﬀerences, Capital Flows. JEL: F15, F16, F32. I acknowledge
the comments of Rodrigo Cerda.
2Sebastian Claro. (sclaro@faceapuc.cl) Instituto de Economia, Universidad Catolica de Chile, Casilla 76, Correo 17,
Santiago - Chile. Phone (56 2) 354 4325 Fax (56 2) 553 2377
11A S i m p l e M o d e l
The world is comprised by many countries. There are two tradable goods, x and y, and a non-tradable good
n.C o m m o d i t y x is capital-intensive, while n is labor-intensive ((K/L)x > (K/L)y > (K/L)n). Each good
is produced with CRS ﬁxed-proportions technology3, and two factors of production: labor L and capital K.
Product and factor markets are perfectly competitive.
Countries are price takers. Nevertheless, domestic prices are aﬀected by tariﬀs imposed in each country.
Regarding factor markets, labor is completely mobile across sectors within a country but immobile interna-
tionally. Capital is mobile across borders, but the return to capital is not completelly equalized because
there are some restrictions for capital ﬂows. In particular, the international return to capital faced by a
country is r∗, that is set in a big foreign country denoted hereafter with a ∗. However, the domestic return
to capital r is only a fraction of r∗ due to restrictions to capital movements: r = λr∗ where λ ∈ (0,1] is a
policy variable that reﬂects the degree of international ﬁnancial integration. The zero-proﬁt condition in







i is the domestic price of good i (pn in the case of the non-tradable good and pw
i (1 + τc
i) for
x and y where pw
i is the world price of good i and τc
i is the tariﬀ in industry i).a c
Fi is the technology
parameter that measures the requirement of factor F = L,K to produce one unit of good i.4 Finally, wc
and λ
cr∗ are domestic wages and return to capital. I also assume that there exist sector-speciﬁch i c k s - n e u t r a l
international technology diﬀerences. Algebraically, ac









i > 0.T h e
rationale for this assumption is the following. An analysis of the wage and employment implications of global
integration in developing countries must take into account cross-country wage diﬀerences. Treﬂer (1993)
provides evidence that international wage diﬀerences are related to international technology diﬀerences.
3This assumption is not harmless. Some of the results hinge upon the assumption of no substitution between labor and
capital within-industries. However, the results hold if there are short-run restrictions to the substitutability of factors.
4See Jones (1961) for a simple derivation of this type of model.
2Lucas (1990) also stresses the role of some form of technology diﬀerences to explain why the return to
capital is not higher in labor-abundant countries.
For tradable sectors, equation (1) can be rewritten as (hereafter, I eliminate the superscript c unless
required for presentation purposes)
pw
i (1 + τi)=( 1+δi)(a∗
Liw + a∗
Kiλr∗). (2)
In the initial equilibrium, I assume that λ,τx and τy are such that both tradable goods are produced.




















Fi is the share of factor F = L,K in value-added in sector i = x,y. Relative wages w/w∗ are
decreasing on δi and λ.T a r i ﬀsa l s oa ﬀect nominal wage diﬀerences, but their impact on real wages is
ambiguous due to their eﬀect on average consumer prices.
1.1 Globalization under Flexible Prices
Consider that globalization is a process of increasing integration in goods and capital markets. In terms
of the model, this implies a fall in average tariﬀsa n dar i s ei nλ
c.5 Consider ﬁrst the case of a rise in λ.
Given τx and τy, capital-intensive sector x becomes non-competitive. This is evident from estimating the





expression is smaller in x. The new equilibrium wage rate is determined by the zero proﬁt condition in the
























5In Claro (2003b) I endogenize the relationship between trade policy and ﬁnancial integration. In this model, they represent
independent policy choices.
3These results are intuitive. Greater capital-market integration implies a rise in the cost of capital in
the domestic country, bringing the capital-intensive sector out of business. A fall in wages is required to
keep competitive the labor-intensive sector, and the size of the adjustment depends on the relative factor-
intensity in that sector. This implies a fal li nt h ep r i c eo ft h en o n - t r a d a b l eg o o d−a depreciation of the real
exchange rate. The expansion of sector n and specialization in labor-intensive y implies an improvement in
the current account. Compared to the pre-integration equilibrium, a fall in capital inﬂows or an increase in
capital outﬂows takes place. I denote this case as unlimited globalization.
What happens if this country wants to avoid the disappearance of the capital intensive sector? In order
to keep a diversiﬁed production structure of tradable goods, governments adjust their tariﬀ structures rising
relative protection for sector x at the expense of falling protection for industry y (See Claro (2003a) for
evidence regarding changes in tariﬀ structures). For any given average tariﬀ level τ, sectorial tariﬀs change
in order to keep both tradable sectors competitive.6 The equilibrium change in domestic wages results from




4 (1 + τx)=a∗





4 (1 + τy)=a∗
Ly 4 w + a∗
Kyr∗ 4 λ
γx 4 (1 + τx)+γx 4 (1 + τx)=4τ.




















Consider ﬁrst that 4τ =0 . The fall in domestic wages is greater than in (4). This is consistent with
the required increase in protection to industry x. The fall in wages is even greater if average tariﬀs fall;
4τ ≤ 0. This result reveals that a diversiﬁed production structure is sustained with greater distortions in





















6Average tariﬀsa r eg i v e nb yτ =
P
i=x,y γi(1 + τi).
4Consistent with the evolution of wages, the equilibrium depreciation of the real exchange rate is greater
than in the case of unlimited globalization. The term in square brackets in (7) is greater (in absolute terms)
than the corresponding term in equation (5). Again, it is not clear whether the new equilibrium implies
capital inﬂows or outﬂows, but an improvement in the current account compared to the initial equilibrium
is expected.7
1.2 Globalization under Sticky Prices
In this section I analyze the impact of sticky nominal non-tradable prices, and therefore demand determined
non-tradable production, on the evolution of wages and employment. Unlike the previous case, unemploy-
ment may arise if restrictions to the size of the current account deﬁcit exist. For simplicity, I assume that
wages are not sticky. This asymmetry between nominal wages and non-tradable prices assures that at least
one tradable sector remains productive.
As before, ﬁnancial integration generates downward pressures on domestic wages and non-tradable prices.
However, 4pn =0 . Non-tradable output and factor usage (Ln and Kn) will depend on the evolution of
demand, in particular, on nominal income. Assuming that individuals have identical log-linear utility
functions, non-tradable consumption is a constant share of income: pncn = α(wL+rK). For a constant pn,











= Qn(Ln,K n) · pn0 (9)
where w0 and w1 are the wage rate before and after the change in λ. Similar for r. K is the domestic
stock of capital, while Le is the aggregate level of employment. Under full employment, Le = L.E q u a t i o n
(8) is self explanatory. The right-hand-side of (9) represents ﬁnal non-tradable production valued at initial
7Compared to the post-integration equilibrium with specialization, it is not clear the eﬀect on capital ﬂows of an intervention-
ist policy. The non-interventionist scenario implies a smaller non-tradable sector, and therefore greater capital inﬂows to reach
the factor requirements in the labor-intensive industry. However, the interventionist equilibrium encourages the production of
the capital-intensive good, attracting foreign capital.
5non-tradable prices. The left-hand-side of (9) represents non-tradable demand, that depends on nominal
income. The eﬀects of changes in λ on nominal income are twofold. First, it aﬀects relative factor prices
change, but this is a second order eﬀect. Second, changes in λ aﬀect income depending on aggregate labor
and capital usage. Under full employment, there is no eﬀect on income and non-tradable demand. Therefore,
at constant pn there is no change in Ln and Kn. In this scenario, production of the labor-intensive tradable
is either consistent with capital inﬂows or capital outﬂows, depending on the size of the non-tradable sector


















, the initial equilibrium (with x and y being produced) was supported with
capital inﬂows (4K>0).8 I ft h ei n c r e a s ei nλ does not aﬀect factor usage in the non-tradable sector,
positive but smaller capital inﬂows must take place in order to keep full employment and positive production
in sector y. T h i si se v i d e n ti nﬁgure 1 that depicts the traditional Lerner-Pearce Diagram with unit-value
isoquants for x,y and n. Initially, domestic factor prices are w0 and r0. The economy’s endowment vector
is V , and factor usage in sector n is V − A. Capital inﬂows are AA2.9 T h ei n c r e a s ei nλ generates a
shift in the unit-cost curve consistent with the new cost of capital r1. Under full employment and sticky
prices, no change in non-tradable demand and factor usage takes place. Therefore, the new equilibrium with
specialization in y implies capital inﬂows of AA1 <A A 2.W i t h ﬂexible prices, the increase in non-tradable
supply generates a rise in factor usage. Graphically, the factor endowment available for tradable production
is B, and capital inﬂows are BB1, smaller than under sticky prices.
If the capital account is completelly open in the sense that there are no restrictions to the size of the current
account deﬁcit a country can run, the full-employment equilibrium is the unique equilibrium, independent of
the size of the non-tradable sector. Price stickiness does not introduce employment costs. It only limits the
size of the non-tradable sector to its demand-determined level. The remaining factors are either employed
in sector y or internationally traded, in the case of capital.
8For sake of presentation, I only focus on the case with capital inﬂows in the initial equilibrium. The other cases are similar.
9Strictly speaking, production of x and y require capital inﬂows of AA1 + ε.
6However, if there are some restrictions to the size of the current account deﬁcit a country can run,
new equilibria are possible. For example, suppose the supply of funds is totally elastic up to some level
4KM > 0, and inelastic thereafter. It is possible to ﬁnd an equilibrium where Le < L is validated with a
lower demand for the non-tradable good. In particular, a lower employment level generates a fall in income
and non-tradable production. In terms of ﬁgure 1, C represents the availability of factors for tradable
production after factor usage in sector n. Capital inﬂows required to produce labor-intensive y are CC1.I f
CC1 < 4KM, an equilibrium with unemployment is not possible. However, if CC1 > 4KM = CD, capital
inﬂows of 4KM take place and unemployment is DD1. This is an equilibrium as long as Le = L−DD1 is
consistent with the demand for n implicit in C. In general, an equilibrium with aggregate employment Le
is attainable if ky =( K + 4KM − Kn(Le))/(Le − Ln(Le)) and Le < L. The full employment equilibrium
is always possible. The model does not provide any element to pin down which equilibrium will prevail.
With limited globalization, unemployment may also arise. In this case, capital inﬂows required to
sustain a diversiﬁed product mix are greater than those under specialization in y. In terms of ﬁgure
1, if the endowment vector for tradable production is C,a n d4KM = CD, aggregate unemployment is
DD2 >D D 1.10 It is possible to show that ∂Le/∂w1 < 0, revealing that the level of aggregate employment
consistent with equilibrium unemployment is lower with an interventionist policy that pushes wages down.
Moreover, a diversiﬁed strategy may generate unemployment in a scenario where laissez-faire leads to full
employment.
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